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Abstract 
 
Despite the long-recognized interlinkages between global energy consumption and climate 
change, there has historically been only limited policy interaction, let alone integration, 
between the two fields. This compartmentalization is mirrored in scholarship, where much 
research has focused on the fragmentation of, respectively, global energy and global climate 
governance, but only little has been said about how these fields might be integrated. Our 
analysis of the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) changing activities in recent years shows 
that governance integration – both within global energy governance and between global 
energy and climate governance – is now happening. The IEA has broadened its portfolio to 
embrace the full spectrum of energy issues, including renewable energy and climate change; 
it has built and is expanding key partnerships with both the UN climate convention and the 
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA); and it has become an authoritative 
advocate for the inter-related goals of a low-carbon transition and climate change mitigation. 
We show that these developments are not the result of a top-down plan, but have rather 
emerged through the Agency’s various efforts to pursue its energy-centric mandate in a fast-
changing global policy environment. 
 
Keywords: Global energy governance; Global climate governance; Governance integration; 
Organizational change; International Energy Agency 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since the 19th century, global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion have 
grown from almost zero to over 31 gigatonnes annually, making energy consumption the 
most important source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by far (IEA, 2013a, see also IPCC, 
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2014). Despite the rise of renewable energy technologies, global dependence on coal, natural 
gas and oil for electricity generation, heating and cooling, transportation and industrial 
processes continues, with rapid rises of GHG emissions after a temporary slowdown in the 
wake of the 2008 global financial crisis (see e.g. BP, 2014). In addition, emissions are 
generated through the consumption and production of energy related to land use, notably in 
the clearing of land, the use of machines and oil-based plant fertilizer, and biofuel agriculture. 
As a consequence, global carbon dioxide emissions in 2012 were almost 60% higher than in 
1990 (Peters et al., 2012). IPCC (2014) estimates suggest that if current emissions trajectories 
continue, it will be impossible to keep the rise in global average surface temperatures to 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels (see also World Bank, 2014).1 
Surprisingly, despite the long-recognized clear interlinkages between global energy 
consumption and climate change,2 there has historically been only limited policy interaction, 
let alone integration, between the two fields. For years, the climate convention process did 
not directly define the climate change problem as one largely about energy use. The 1997 
Kyoto Protocol mentions energy only six times (of which twice in the Annex), there is no 
single mention of fossil fuels or coal, and oil and gas are only mentioned once in Annex A 
(UNFCCC, 1997). Many country delegations to official negotiations under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have historically been led by 
environment and foreign ministry representatives rather than officials from ministries 
responsible for energy or natural resources, underlining the policy-making disconnect 
between energy systems and their environmental impact.3  
The same problem manifests at the national level. Although since the late 2000s some 
countries have sought to integrate responsibility for energy and climate policy by creating 
new ministries – prominent examples being Denmark’s Ministry of Climate and Energy 
(created in 2007) and the UK’s Department of Energy and Climate Change (created in 2008) 
– institutional separation remains the norm, and compartmentalization has been observed to 
                                                          
1
 Others have argued that the 2°C goal – the oft-predicted threshold for dangerous climate change – is 
misleading and should be “ditched” as it is not scientifically meaningful and only politically motivated when 
emissions reduction progress to date does not match up with actual demands (Victor and Kennel, 2014). 
2
 As one of our anonymous reviewers has pointed out, some analysts dispute the precise nature of the linkage 
between greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and climate change. Although we recognize that there are 
complexities and uncertainties in climate science and possible outcomes of GHG emissions, our focus is on the 
process by which the IEA has added climate change to its portfolio.  
3
 Interview with former senior UK negotiator to the climate convention, March 2015. The former negotiator also 
pointed out that due to a lack of interest in climate change and broader environmental concerns and, relatedly, 
an absence of environment ministries or equivalent, some countries (e.g. OPEC members) were for many years 
represented only through their energy and resource ministries. On renewable energy policies in Arab OPEC 
countries, see e.g. Atalay, et al. (2015). 
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continue even after location of national responsibility for both fields in the same ministry.4 
Moreover, although a growing number of governments have set national GHG emissions 
targets for the medium and long term, only few have also managed to design, let alone 
successfully implement, an energy policy in line with the acknowledged urgent need to 
decarbonize their economies.5 
The problem is compounded by the institutional architecture of global energy 
governance (see e.g. Escribano, 2015; Goldthau and Witte, 2010; Van de Graaf, 2013a), 
which remains highly fragmented and ill-equipped to effectively address the core policy 
challenges related to both energy use and – the focus of our paper – its consequences for 
global climate change. Adopting a general conceptual frame developed by Biermann et al. 
(2009b; 2010), we define as the global governance architecture the “overarching system of 
public and private institutions that are valid or active in a given issue area,” i.e. as comprising 
“organizations, regimes, and other forms of principles, norms, regulations and decision-
making procedures” (Biermann et al., 2009b: 15). It was geopolitics and crisis that impelled 
the emergence in the second half of the 20th century of a globe-spanning governance 
architecture in the energy field, when oil producer and consumer countries realized that in 
order to preserve their respective interests and reduce transaction costs they would be well 
served by forming organizations amongst like-minded members.6 Consequently, the onset of 
global climate change as an inescapable policy problem, and the need to decarbonize national 
energy systems if emissions reduction goals are to be met, have posed great challenges to an 
architecture whose main participants have largely been used to focusing on energy supply 
and demand dynamics rather than the environmental implications of fossil fuel combustion.7 
And yet, as this article shows, significant moves towards the integration of energy and 
climate policy are emerging in unexpected ways. By analyzing the activities in recent years 
of the International Energy Agency (IEA), often considered the key organization in the 
fragmented landscape of global energy governance (see e.g. Leverett, 2010; Florini, 2011; 
Van de Graaf, 2012), we argue that the IEA is becoming an important and influential agent in 
                                                          
4
 Interview with national official involved in the IEA, August 2014. 
5
 Denmark is a notable example of success. Apart from creating institutional synergies at ministerial level, and 
long being a leader on climate change mitigation, Denmark is working towards the goal of completely 
decarbonizing its energy system by 2050 through an integrated policy framework. According to the 2015 
Climate Change Performance Index, Denmark has the world’s best climate policy, followed by Sweden and the 
UK (Burck et al., 2015).       
6
 This architecture may be described as bifurcated in that it initially split into oil producer and consumer country 
institutions, respectively, the two most prominent of these being the IEA (consumers) and OPEC (producers). 
7
 Interview with IEA official, September 2014. 
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the integration of global climate and energy governance. We focus on significant 
developments in three areas: the broadening of the IEA’s issue portfolio, its increasing 
cooperation and partnership with the UNFCCC and the International Renewable Energy 
Agency (IRENA), and its growing advocacy for mitigating climate change and transitioning 
to a low-carbon future. We find that the IEA’s increasingly consequential role in integration 
both within global energy governance and between the energy and climate governance fields 
derives not from a designed strategy or top-down plan, but emerges through its various 
efforts to pursue its energy-centric mandate in a complex and fast-changing global policy 
environment. That is, rather than a response to explicit demands from its member states, the 
IEA’s role in integrating global energy and climate governance emerges through 
organizational change and adaptation impelled by today’s global policy environment and 
novel ways in which it is exercising its organizational autonomy.8 
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1. Literature review 
 
The compartmentalization between energy and climate change policy addressed above is also 
reflected in academic research and writing, with scholarships of environmental and energy 
governance largely evolving as if in two separate streams. While the International Relations 
(IR) literature addressing the management of global environmental issues dates back to the 
1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, the field did not 
fully “come into its own” until the late 1980s and 1990s (O’Neill, 2009: 7). It is during this 
time that IR scholars began to seriously address the formation of international environmental 
regimes and institutions (see e.g. Bernauer, 1995; Haas et al., 1993; Sprinz and Helm, 1999; 
Wettestad, 1999; Young, 1989). During the following two decades, the field grew further 
while also incorporating the new concept of global governance as different from an 
international, state-centered perspective. Scholars began conducting more research into the 
role played by international organizations, non-governmental organizations, transnational 
                                                          
8
 For a critical discussion of international organizations as autonomous actors in world politics, i.e. independent 
from their (state) members, see Barnett and Finnemore (1999, 2004). In contrast to Barnett and Finnemore’s 
criticism, the analysis here shows how the IEA’s changing role is in fact serving to overcome the collective 
action problems inherent to the fragmentation of global energy and climate governance and the divide between 
them. For an in-depth discussion of the autonomy of international bureaucracies as different from international 
organizations see Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009). 
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advocacy networks and business actors (see e.g. Biermann et al., 2009a; Falkner, 2008; Ford, 
2003; Oberthür and Stokke, 2011; Pattberg, 2007; Wapner, 1995). However, global climate 
change governance (as a particular kind of environmental governance) has arguably received 
the most scholarly attention in recent years, with a wide range of publications focusing on all 
aspects of the global climate governance architecture (see e.g. Biermann et al., 2010; 
Bulkeley et al., 2014; Bulkeley and Newell, 2010; Gupta, 2014; Held et al., 2011; Held et al., 
2013; Helm, 2005; Helm and Hepburn, 2009; Hoffmann, 2011; Stevenson and Dryzek, 2014). 
An important strand of this literature has been an analysis of the fragmentation of the global 
climate governance architecture (see e.g. Biermann et al., 2009b; van Asselt, 2014; van 
Asselt and Zelli, 2014; Zelli, 2011).  
Influenced by the 1970s oil crises, much of the earlier academic research on energy 
policy focused on questions of energy security and developments in world oil markets (see 
e.g. Adelman, 1973; Surrey, 1974). Research on global energy governance, defined here as 
the “international collective action efforts undertaken to manage and distribute energy 
resources and provide energy services” (Florini and Sovacool, 2009: 5239), has only emerged 
more recently (Cherp et al., 2011; Goldthau, 2011; Goldthau and Witte, 2010; Lesage et al., 
2010; Meyer, 2013; Van de Graaf, 2013a). Subfields to this literature have endeavoured to 
analyze the role of specific organizations in a more complex world in which energy policy 
decisions are shaped by a multitude of actors across the Global North and South. These 
organizations include the IEA (see e.g. Colgan, 2009; Florini, 2010; Florini and Sovacool, 
2009; Kohl, 2010; Leverett, 2010; Van de Graaf, 2012; Van de Graaf and Lesage, 2009), the 
Organization for the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (see e.g. Colgan, 2014; Gately 
et al., 2013; Hochman and Zilberman, 2015; Wittmann, 2013) and, to a lesser extent, IRENA 
(see e.g. Urpelainen and Van de Graaf, 2015; Van de Graaf, 2013b).  
Like its counterpart in global climate governance, the literature on global energy 
governance has identified the fragmentation of governance architectures as a key challenge 
(Leal-Arcas et al., 2015; Meyer, 2013; Van de Graaf, 2013a). Even more so than global 
climate governance, global energy governance consists of a large number of actors that are 
not fully interlinked or integrated. Although there is no core organization that unites all 
countries under a single roof, the IEA is often seen as occupying a key role in global energy 
governance as “the world’s leading authority on energy economics” (Harvey, 2012b) and 
“the single most important institution for energy importing countries” (Colgan, 2009: 5). 
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However, while fragmentation within global energy governance and within global 
climate governance is increasingly well-researched and understood, there are only very few 
publications today that have attempted to address existing gaps between the two architectures, 
taking an integrated look at the two fields which does not simply treat one as the addendum 
of the other (Falkner, 2014; Fouquet, 2013; Meyer, 2013; Zelli et al., 2013).9 This includes 
attempts to understand planet-wide transformation through the new, holistic paradigm of 
earth system governance which incorporates various different governance agendas, including 
energy, environment, food and water (Biermann, 2014).  
 What is missing beyond these accounts, however, is serious attention to the 
interlinkages and convergence between the global energy and climate governance 
architectures and the organizational and policy changes inherent to these. This is problematic 
given the closely intertwined nature of energy consumption and climate change, as well as 
the now widely accepted urgent need to address these issues in a joined-up fashion. This 
article is a contribution to addressing this gap. Our starting point is Van de Graaf’s (2012: 
241) call for an analysis of the evolving role of the IEA in global climate governance, 
something that has received scant attention so far. Our research is informed by the conviction 
that the possibility of resolving the key problem of climate change is served not, as some 
have argued, by a further fragmentation of the global energy governance architecture to “de-
emphasize linkages” (Meyer, 2013: 389), or indeed by shifting responsibility for addressing 
climate change away from the UNFCCC towards energy institutions, but instead by greater 
integration and linkages both within global energy governance and between the existing 
governance architectures in the climate and energy field. 
 
2.2. Concepts 
 
Building on Garcia et al. (2014) we define governance integration as a positive interaction of 
actors either within a governance architecture or between two (or more) different governance 
architectures which result in a convergence of policies and practices.10 Governance 
integration, whether within a governance architecture or between two different architectures, 
can only begin to occur if at least one of the actors involved changes or adjusts their approach 
                                                          
9
 In contrast, there is a wider range of publications addressing overlap between global climate governance and 
governance of global trade, biodiversity, etc. (see e.g. Epps and Green, 2010; Oberthür and Stokke, 2011; van 
Asselt, 2014). 
10
 Garcia et al. refer to ‘streams of governance’ (e.g. fisheries and biodiversity governance) while we use the 
term ‘governance architectures’ as introduced above.   
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and practices in ways that establish clear interlinkages with the approach and actions of 
another actor or group of actors. In the context of global energy governance, it would require 
at least one of the international organizations (such as the IEA) to break with established 
patterns and start behaving in ways that create linkages with other organizations, operating 
either within global energy governance or in global climate governance.  
We argue that the changes in the IEA’s approaches and activities are linked to forms 
of organizational innovation and change related to the Agency’s engagement with a changing 
global policy environment. Organizational innovation and change are subjects of a vast 
literature, especially in management studies and sociology (see e.g. Damanpour, 1991; 
Damanpour and Schneider, 2006; Hage 1988; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Levitt and March, 
1988). Hage (1999: 599, see also Damanpour and Evan, 1984) defines organizational 
innovation as “the adoption of an idea or behaviour that is new to the organization.” This 
innovation is further thought to consist of the three elements of “change, novelty and 
improvements in performance” within the organization (Lamprinakis, 2012: 96; see also 
Johannessen et al. 2001). Whilst a useful start, this literature’s focus on innovation and 
changes in business practices in, predominantly, private sector organizations only goes so far 
for our purposes, that is, an analysis of the dynamics of policy change. This, however, is a 
central interest of the field of public policy, wherein policy change is generally understood as 
“an alteration in the commitment of a government to an objective” (Jones and Baumgartner, 
2005: 117), that is, a change in the way governments address and manage policy problems, 
usually on the basis of regulatory and legislative change (see also Baumgartner and Jones, 
1993; Howlett et al., 2009; John, 2003; Kingdon, 2002; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
For example, if the objective is to cut GHG emissions, the ‘commitment’ would come in the 
form of new legislation (e.g. enshrining national emissions targets or renewable energy 
support schemes in law) or the creation of new institutional arrangements (e.g. integrating 
responsibility for energy and climate policy in a new ministry). Such changes break with 
established patterns of governance, either adapting them to new external realities, or 
producing entirely new ways to deal with perceived problems.  
We thus define organizational change as the change in the commitment of an 
organization to an objective, resulting in the adoption of new approaches and activities. It is 
these activities which we set out to trace and analyze below. The specific context we focus on, 
that of intergovernmental organizations such as the IEA operating in a changing policy 
environment, has not been well addressed by management studies, which typically focus on 
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organizational, rather than policy change, or, indeed, by the public policy literature, which 
tends to focus on policy change at the national rather than the international level. Both 
literatures offer important insights which we draw on, along with those of the emergent 
literature on ‘international bureaucracies’ (Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2009). The core 
contribution of this article is the analysis of emergent integration between energy governance 
and climate governance, something largely neglected thus far in studies of both governance 
fields, especially given the long-standing separation between them highlighted above. Our 
analysis proceeds through a detailed study of the evolving activities through which the IEA is 
becoming an important and influential actor in advancing this integration. As such, the article 
is also a modest contribution to analyses of organizational change, although space constraints 
prevent us from a more in-depth theoretical discussion. 
 
2.3. Materials used and structure 
 
Our analysis draws on a variety of sources, including IEA publications, official website 
information, other academic studies, international media reports, and a series of elite 
interviews and background conversations with IEA and UNFCCC officials. Most of the 
interviews were granted on the condition of anonymity, and we therefore refer to them in a 
non-attributable way. In the following section, we lend empirical credibility to changes 
within the IEA through tracing the aforementioned three sets of activities: broadening the 
issue portfolio, increasing cooperation with the UNFCCC and IRENA, and a growing 
advocacy on behalf of a low-carbon transition. The next section discusses our findings in 
light of their implications for integration both within the field of energy governance as well 
as between energy and climate governance. We also discuss reasons for the IEA’s observed 
organizational change and point to challenges for further governance integration. The article 
concludes with a look at implications for the IEA’s role as an international organization.  
 
3. Results: The IEA as an adaptive organization 
 
The IEA was established in 1974 as an autonomous organization within the framework of the 
OECD. Its founding was a direct response to the 1973 oil crisis which had come as the 
consequence of both a reduction in oil production and an oil embargo imposed by OPEC 
members in answer to the Yom Kippur War fought between Israel and a coalition of Arab 
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states led by Egypt and Syria. OECD countries, the world’s major oil consumers at the time, 
were hit hard by the resulting oil price shock but they initially failed to react in a coordinated 
fashion, instead engaging in “competitive behaviors such as stockpiling and hoarding of oil 
reserves” which drove costs up even further (Florini and Sovacool, 2009: 5242). The IEA’s 
original role was, thus, to prevent similarly uncoordinated measures in the face of future oil 
supply emergencies, helping OECD countries coordinate effective collective responses. Its 
mandate included a variety of measures intended to improve the energy supply security of its 
member countries, such as an information system closely tracking developments in oil 
markets and a framework for cooperation with oil companies. Critically, IEA members were 
required to hold emergency oil reserves “sufficient to sustain consumption for at least 60 days 
with no net oil imports” (Bamberger, 2004: 125), a limit since increased to 90 days. 
Although not part of its formal mandate, towards the end of the Cold War, the IEA 
began to consider the impact of energy production and consumption on the environment, 
establishing initial links between energy and environmental policy. The first Ministerial 
Statement and Conclusions on Energy and the Environment was released by the IEA on 9 
July 1985. Although the wording of this statement was quite general, it nevertheless included 
agreement on using energy more efficiently, combusting coal in an environmentally 
acceptable way, increasing the use of natural gas, and promoting renewable sources of energy. 
Environmental issues were kept on the agenda thereafter. In 1993, the Ministerial Declaration 
and Recommendation on Energy and the Environment urged ratification of the climate 
convention (for reproductions of the original documents see Scott, 1995, pp. 272-285). That 
same year, the organization officially expanded its scope beyond the primary objective of 
ensuring energy security to include as further goals economic development and 
environmental protection (Scott, 1994: 386).11 The IEA also made some early forays into 
alternative energy technologies such as nuclear power and renewables. Despite these 
developments, the IEA’s role has not been sufficiently recognized, because of its historic 
image as “an institution mainly concerned with fossil fuels” (Van de Graaf, 2012: 240).  
However, as our analysis below shows, the IEA has now effectively broadened into 
an organization which tackles the full range of energy technologies and policy issues. We 
focus in particular on three sets of activities. First, we show how the IEA has expanded its 
portfolio to embrace the full spectrum of energy issues, including renewable energy and 
                                                          
11
 A discussion of energy security is beyond the scope of this paper. For a good introduction to the concept, 
including the different definitions in existence today see, for example, Chester (2010), Kruyt et al. (2009), 
Sovacool and Brown (2010) and Yergin (2011). 
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climate change. Second, we show that the IEA has built and is expanding a number of key 
partnerships with organizations in both the global energy governance and the global climate 
governance fields. Third, we show the IEA has become an authoritative advocate for the 
inter-related goals of shifting away from fossil fuels and taking action to mitigate climate 
change. 
 
3.1. Widening issue portfolio 
 
Since the creation of the IEA, the number of energy technologies and actors involved has 
proliferated, as has the number of energy policies enacted worldwide. Over the years, the IEA 
has been criticized for not sufficiently acknowledging this change. Much of this criticism has 
revolved around the Agency’s perceived lack of unbiased attention given to renewables. For 
example, the Agency has been dismissed as “for the most part not qualified to represent the 
interests of renewable energy at the international level” because of its role in advancing the 
cause of fossil fuels and nuclear power (Hirschl, 2009: 4409). The creation of IRENA can be 
seen as at least in part a result of the frustration over the IEA’s downplaying of the role of 
renewables (Van de Graaf and Lesage, 2009). It is undeniable that the IEA’s earlier 
conservative projections for installed capacity (e.g. in wind energy) were later outstripped by 
actual developments. However, the IEA was hardly the only organization that got it wrong. 
The US Department of Energy, the World Bank and even the European Wind Energy 
Association - the European wind industry’s own roof organization in Brussels - all 
underestimated actual installed capacity (REN21, 2012). 
There is evidence that the IEA has taken on board some of the criticism in recent 
years, which may have been in part the result of the “salutary shock” (Van de Graaf, 2012: 
239) provided by the creation of IRENA as a potential rival organization. Renewable energy 
plays a much bigger part of the Agency’s issue portfolio today than ten years ago. It is now 
addressed by a separate Division and in 2011, the IEA established the Renewable Energy 
Industry Advisory Board (RIAB) to enhance links between the Agency and leading 
renewable energy industry stakeholders. IEA reports which acknowledge the rapid scaling up 
and increasing cost competitiveness of renewable energy sources such as onshore wind and 
solar photovoltaics are now issued on a regular basis (see e.g. IEA, 2010; IEA, 2012a; IEA, 
2014a). The change towards a more positive outlook is perhaps best illustrated by two solar 
technology reports published in late 2014 which together spell out an ambitious vision for 
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solar energy to become the world’s largest electricity source by 2050 and contribute to a 
significant reduction in CO2 emissions, the core goal of global climate governance (IEA, 
2014b; IEA, 2014c).  
In part, these efforts are in line with the Agency’s moves since the mid-2000s to 
expand its issue portfolio by gathering more statistics on electricity production, trade and 
consumption on a monthly basis for all OECD member countries, and publish reports on 
various aspects of electricity markets. Ahead of the launch of the IEA’s 2014 Energy 
Technology Perspectives report, IEA Director Maria van der Hoeven argued that rather than 
oil, it is electricity which “is going to play a defining role in the first half of this century as 
the energy carrier that increasingly powers economic growth and development” (IEA, 2014d). 
With the growing importance of renewables in electricity generation, it is only natural to 
devote more attention to the issue.12 This is all the more so considering that all of the IEA’s 
member countries have either moved to aggressively expand their domestic renewable energy 
portfolios or are planning to do so. Another important reason for the greater emphasis on 
renewables, however, has been the better staffing and resourcing of work on issues other than 
fossil fuels, in line with the changing priorities amongst IEA member countries.13 For 
example, both the Agency’s renewables and energy efficiency units have grown in recent 
years, resulting in a more expansive gathering of statistics, more expert workshops in both 
member and partner countries, and publication of a growing number of in-depth reports. 
Alongside its growing work on renewables, the Agency has increasingly focused on 
global climate change. Scarcely an issue in the infant days of global energy governance, 
climate change has since become one of the determinants of a modern, 21st century energy 
policy. Like its member countries, the IEA has had to respond and adjust to this change.14 In 
contrast to its earlier work, the organization significantly expanded its focus following the 
2005 G8 summit at Gleneagles (Florini and Sovacool, 2009: 5243). The IEA gathers CO2 
emissions statistics, maintains a database on GHG emissions policies undertaken by member 
states and since 2008, all World Energy Outlooks (WEO) – the IEA’s annual flagship 
                                                          
12
 While there is a wider range of low-carbon technologies, including nuclear power, we focus on renewables. 
This is because the recent changes in the IEA’s approach discussed here are significantly more pronounced with 
regards to renewables than nuclear power or, for example, energy efficiency, both of which have been a 
significant part of the Agency’s portfolio for much longer. However, it should be noted that, as the ‘2015 
Technology Roadmap: Nuclear Energy’, jointly published by the IEA and the OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency 
(NEA) states, nuclear energy has a prominent role in the decarbonization of power systems, emphasizing that 
under the IEA’s 2°C scenario, “global installed capacity would need to more than double.” We thank an 
anonymous reviewer for this point.  
13
 Interview with national official involved in the IEA, August 2014. 
14
 Interview with IEA official, September 2014. 
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publication – have devoted substantial and growing attention to climate change.15 Critically, 
WEOs fall under the editorial authority of IEA Chief Economist Fatih Birol, a vocal advocate 
of acting on climate change (see below). This helps in part to explain why the WEO would 
focus as much on climate change even when the issue had slipped down the international 
policy agenda during the global financial crisis and its aftermath. Moreover, as one IEA 
official pointed out, there is little editorial interference from member states with the 
organization’s reports, although country representatives are usually invited to provide 
comments, input and suggestions.16 Thus, while the interests of member countries are 
important in determining the Agency’s overall direction, a certain degree of flexibility and 
culture of independent research also give IEA officials a chance to pursue more independent 
agendas and, as in the case of climate change, help reinvigorate the debate.17  
Over time, the Agency has become “better at doing climate work,” adding a “clear 
climate lens” to its assessments.18 This is also reflected in the WEO Special Reports which 
have highlighted clear linkages between the energy and climate policy fields. In 2013, the 
IEA published “Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map,” which defined changes in the energy 
sector as the “key to limiting climate change” and proposed a number of energy policy 
solutions to “help keep the door open to the 2°C target through to 2020” (IEA, 2013a). This 
was followed by the 2014 Energy, Climate Change and Environment Insight Report 
presented to delegates at the 20th Conference of the Parties (COP 20) to the UNFCCC in 
Lima. In June 2015, the Agency published a WEO Special Report on climate change ahead of 
COP 21 in Paris, which, explicitly emphasizing energy use and climate change as 
inextricably linked, spelled out a number of key steps needed from an energy perspective to 
achieve success at the UN climate talks and beyond (IEA, 2015a). A stakeholder meeting 
presenting the preliminary conclusions of the report in early March 2015 was attended, 
according to IEA officials, by all the key players in the global climate policy arena, reflecting 
the IEA’s convening power and its newfound “weight in the climate debates.”19  
Although the number of IEA staff working specifically on environmental issues is still 
quite small and large parts of the Agency “go on cheerfully without addressing climate 
                                                          
15
 We define substantial attention as devoting at least one of the major segments/ parts of the WEO to climate 
change. The WEO 2007 already addressed climate change and GHG issues but it did so in a more ancillary 
fashion. The change to the WEO 2008 (and WEOs thereafter) is significant.  
16
 Interview with IEA official, June 2015. 
17
 Interview with IEA official, March 2015. 
18
 Interview with former senior UK negotiator to the climate convention, March 2015. 
19
 Interview with IEA official, March 2015. 
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change directly,”20 what is important for our analysis is how major IEA units, such as those 
working on renewables, energy efficiency, energy technologies, electricity markets, carbon 
capture and coal, all increasingly address climate change and GHG emissions as a routine 
part of their work. In part this is a consequence of climate change considerations becoming 
gradually more prominent in these different energy issue areas.21 Another factor, interestingly, 
is the relatively high staff turnover. Permanent IEA contracts are rare and the majority of staff 
turns over every five to six years, resulting in the average age of mid-level staff in the late 
30s and early 40s. As one IEA official put it, the Agency may not pursue a conscious strategy 
of recruiting staff with knowledge of climate policy and an understanding of its connections 
with energy policy-making, but the inflow of younger experts who have been more exposed 
to these issues than their predecessors has nonetheless expanded the IEA’s in-house 
expertise.22 In addition to such internal rebalancing of its issue portfolio, the Agency has 
moved to build bridges between the energy and climate governance architectures, which we 
turn to next.  
 
3.2. Building partnerships  
 
Since 2007, the IEA has supported global climate negotiations by organizing workshops, 
seminars and side events at conferences of the parties, which have facilitated the sharing of 
information and have helped build a better understanding of technical issues amongst country 
delegations.23 In September 2012, the IEA and the UNFCCC Secretariat signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding aimed at reinforcing “mutual efforts to promote clean energy 
and combat climate change” (IEA, 2012b). Both organizations would engage in a closer 
exchange, with the UNFCCC taking responsibility for the overall governance framework of 
climate change mitigation and adaptation and the IEA contributing its experience in energy 
policy and statistics within this framework.  
Specifically, cooperation has developed along five major lines. First, the IEA supports 
the UNFCCC Secretariat in its efforts to establish reliable GHG emissions inventories 
                                                          
20
 Interview with IEA official, June 2015. 
21
 These changes in the global policy environment manifest themselves not just in the IEA, as we discuss here, 
but at all levels of political authority and across all jurisdictions, for example through climate change laws and 
action plans, carbon taxation, emissions trading schemes, renewable energy acts and a wide range of other laws, 
regulations and policies. For an in-depth review of relevant legislation in countries around the world, see 
Nachmany et al. (2014).  
22
 Interview with IEA official, June 2015. 
23
 At COP 20 in Lima alone, the IEA hosted, co-hosted or participated in 19 different events. 
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through an expert review of emissions data – a core function of the climate convention. The 
data provided to the Secretariat by country parties is compared with and verified through 
emissions data provided by the IEA.24 Second, the IEA plays a role in the UNFCCC’s expert 
review process in relation to climate policy measures adopted by country parties to the 
climate convention. As the bulk of GHG emissions is tied to energy use, the majority of 
climate policy is necessarily also energy policy. Third, the IEA has provided input to the 
technical examination process, specifically the UNFCCC’s Workplan on Enhancing 
Mitigation Ambition (Decision 1/CP.17) with the goal of scaling up decarbonization efforts 
in the pre-2020 period. IEA experts have participated in the Workplan’s Technical Expert 
Meetings on issues ranging from energy efficiency and renewable energy sources to carbon 
capture and storage. Fourth, the IEA is also involved in the UNFCCC’s Technology 
Mechanism (Decision 1/CP.16) and its two components, the Technology Executive 
Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network, both of which aim to enhance 
technology development and North-South transfer. This cooperation happens through the 
multilateral, public-private Climate Technology Initiative (CTI), an Implementing Agreement 
under the IEA. For example, the CTI’s Private Financing Advisory Network seeks to help 
mobilize private capital in support of climate –friendly, clean energy businesses operating in 
developing countries. Finally, the Climate Change Experts Group, jointly hosted by the IEA 
and the OECD, provides technical input into the UNFCCC process although it is separate 
from the climate convention. It convenes two meetings per year between government, private 
sector and civil society representatives which are also attended by the UNFCCC, organizes 
side events at conferences of the parties and the annual Bonn climate change conferences, 
and regularly publishes policy papers on issues relevant to the climate negotiations.25 
 In addition to these formal and publicly visible activities, much of the collaboration is 
of a more informal nature, built on routine interactions between IEA, UNFCCC and OECD 
member country officials. For example, Paul Watkinson, Head of the Climate Negotiation 
Team in France’s Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy and a key 
player in preparing COP 21, was “regularly in and out of the IEA” having built a “close 
                                                          
24
 This and following based on interview with UNFCCC official, March 2015. 
25
 There are several mechanisms of cooperation between the IEA and the UNFCCC, for example through the 
Global Fuel Economy Initiative which is also tied in with the G20 and the UN’s Post 2015 Development 
Agenda. The examples discussed here are intended to illustrate the more structured instances of engagement. 
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relationship” with experts at the Agency.26 The IEA has also involved UNFCCC officials in 
shaping the WEO Special Reports through meetings at IEA headquarters in Paris.27  
Connected to this increasingly close cooperation have been the IEA’s moves to build 
closer links with IRENA. IRENA was founded by a number of IEA member countries led by 
Germany to push for an independent intergovernmental organization focused exclusively on 
renewable energy based on the perception of the IEA as captured by powerful fossil fuel and 
nuclear interests and biased against renewables (Van de Graaf, 2013b). Despite the IEA’s 
unease over the creation of IRENA, understood as a competing organization, the activities of 
recent years reflect increasing cooperation and collaboration.  
In early 2012, only three years after the creation of IRENA, the organizations signed 
an official partnership agreement, targeting the development and publication of the 
IEA/IRENA Global Renewable Energy Policies and Measures Database,28 collaboration in 
technology and innovation, and the sharing of renewable energy statistics. Commenting on 
the agreement, IRENA Director General Adnan Z. Amin declared the Agencies to be “natural 
partners in the global quest to increase the deployment of renewable energy” (IRENA, 2012). 
Since then, the organizations have held joint workshops and published a number of energy 
technology briefs, for example on solar photovoltaics and electricity storage. The technology 
briefs are published jointly by IRENA and the IEA’s Energy Technology Systems Analysis 
Programme (ETSAP). In January 2015, IEA Executive Director van der Hoeven was a 
featured guest speaker at IRENA’s Fifth Assembly alongside UNFCCC Executive Secretary 
Christiana Figueres. Two months later she praised the “good cooperation” between the IEA 
and IRENA at the Berlin Energy Transition Dialogue (van der Hoeven, 2015).  
This seemingly rather harmonious relationship between the two Agencies can also be 
explained by the organizational differences that have remained between them (see Meyer, 
2013). Unlike IRENA, the IEA takes a more holistic view of the energy system, underpinned 
by its extensive data-gathering and analysis across the whole range of energy issues, whereas 
IRENA is an organization dedicated to promoting renewables (Urpelainen and Van de Graaf, 
2015). The differing mandates allow for a de-facto division of labor between the two 
organizations, even if this does not mean that rivalry between them has ended altogether.29 
 
                                                          
26
 Interview with IEA official, March 2015. 
27
 Interview with UNFCCC official, March 2015. 
28
 The database can be accessed at http://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/renewableenergy/ 
29
 Interview with IEA official, June 2015. 
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3.3. Advocating change 
 
The third set of activities has been a shift in the IEA’s approach from one largely focused on 
gathering and analyzing energy statistics to one which also openly advocates particular 
energy choices. This is perhaps the most important and yet often overlooked change the IEA 
has undergone in the last few years. Criticized until recently as too favorable towards oil, coal 
and gas and employing “a deliberate method to hedge ever increasing profits for the 
conventional energy sector” (Murray, 2009), the Agency has restyled itself as an influential 
global advocate on behalf of the transition to a low-carbon future and aggressive climate 
change mitigation. This reorientation is reflected in the approach taken by leading figures 
within the organization, who have used their high-profile positions to advocate change. 
Among them are the IEA’s Executive Director Maria van der Hoeven and the IEA’s Chief 
Economist, Fatih Birol, who will follow van der Hoeven as Executive Director in September 
2015. Both were not natural proponents of a low-carbon, climate change agenda but rather 
grew into their new roles over time.30 
Ahead of the 3rd Clean Energy Ministerial held in London in April 2012, van der 
Hoeven, a former Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs, warned that the world’s “addiction to 
fossil fuels grows stronger each year. Many clean energy technologies are available but they 
are not being deployed quickly enough to avert potentially disastrous consequences. […] The 
current state of affairs is unacceptable precisely because we have a responsibility and a 
golden opportunity to act [on climate change]” (Harvey, 2012). Commenting on the 18th 
Conference of the Parties to the climate convention in Doha, Qatar, van der Hoeven 
emphasized “the need to rapidly transition to a more secure, sustainable global energy system” 
in which “carbon emissions must be dramatically reduced” (IEA, 2012c).  
Birol, a former statistician at the OPEC Secretariat, used similar language to position 
the IEA and its 2011 World Energy Outlook in the climate change debate. Following the 
report’s release in November 2011 shortly before the conference of the parties in Durban, he 
chided governments for their insufficient, non-legally binding emissions pledges, arguing that 
“with current policies in place, global temperatures are set to increase 6 degrees Celsius, 
which has catastrophic implications. […] If as of 2017 there is not a start of a major wave of 
new and clean investments, the door to 2 degrees will be closed” (Westall and Dahl, 2011). 
Birol also helped position the Agency at the forefront of the campaign against fossil fuel 
                                                          
30
 Interview with IEA official, September 2014. 
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subsidies, a critical step towards leveling the energy playing field for renewable energy 
sources trying to gain a foothold in the market. As early as 2009, the G20, based on data 
provided by the IEA, called for a phasing out of such subsidies in the “medium term” (Mason 
and Ennis, 2009).  
Speaking to The Guardian in early 2012, Birol emphasized that “energy markets can 
be thought of as suffering from appendicitis due to fossil fuel subsidies […] undermining the 
competitiveness of renewables,” adding that such subsidies “are a hand brake as we drive 
along the road to a sustainable energy future” (Clark, 2012). In 2014, he warned against both 
the growing global use of emissions-intensive coal and continued fossil fuel subsidies, 
arguing that “there is a need to change course in a dramatic way” (Beckman, 2014). Making a 
similar case, van der Hoeven argued that “massive investments in low-carbon technologies – 
renewable energy and energy efficiency – are needed in the power sector if we are to keep 
temperatures from rising more than 2 degrees” above pre-industrial levels (Energy Next, 
2014). Presenting new IEA data in March 2015 which indicated a stalling of global GHG 
emissions from the energy sector in 2014 (albeit at a historically high level), Birol called 
climate change “the most important threat facing us today.” He went on to argue that the new 
data would provide “much-needed momentum to negotiators preparing to forge a global 
climate deal in Paris in December” (IEA, 2015b). Most recently, at the June 2015 launch of 
the WEO Special Report on climate change ahead of the Paris negotiations, van der Hoeven 
pointed to the IEA’s own work in making the case for international action. “As IEA analysis 
has repeatedly shown that the cost and difficulty of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions 
increases every year, time is of the essence” she urged (IEA, 2015c). Birol was unequivocal 
in establishing the connection between energy and climate change governance, arguing that 
“any climate agreement reached at COP21 must have the energy sector at its core or risk 
being judged a failure” (IEA, 2015c). We discuss the implications of such advocacy by 
prominent IEA figures below, but note here how it reflects a significant contrast to 
conventional understandings of the role of the IEA in international policy as essentially 
limited to global energy governance. 
 
4. Discussion and policy implications 
 
Our analysis has identified a number of reasons for the IEA’s observed organizational change. 
First, as renewable sources have become more important in global electricity provision (IEA, 
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2014a), the IEA has expanded its activities in relation to these as part of its mandate. 
Although organizational competition following the creation of IRENA may have been seen as 
one of the reasons stimulating the IEA’s greater focus on renewables, our analysis shows that 
the two organizations have become increasingly cooperative, working closely together in a 
number of different forums. In other words, we emphasize partnership, rather than 
competition as the key dynamic. Second, and relatedly, to varying degrees all IEA member 
countries have pursued policies aimed at expanding renewable energy sources in recent years 
and all have had to address global climate change as one of the 21st century’s key domestic 
and foreign policy challenges. The shift in the IEA’s focus, therefore, has to be seen as 
situated within these developments.31 Third, however, the observed new approaches and 
activities are not merely an agent’s response to its principals’ (member countries’) directives, 
but have also been powerfully driven by key ‘policy entrepreneurs’ within the organization. It 
is as part of pursuing the IEA’s mandate in today’s complex and fast-changing global policy 
environment that leading figures in the Agency, such as Fatih Birol and Maria van der 
Hoeven, are emphasizing the growing importance of mitigating climate change and 
transitioning to low-carbon energy systems, advocating more forcefully on behalf of these 
interconnected agendas. At the same time, IEA units such as the renewables, energy 
efficiency and electricity market units, etc. are increasingly integrating climate change issues 
into the regular work. This is not to say the latter is a consequence of the former, but that the 
salient context for both is the rising prominence of climate change issues in domestic and 
international agendas, making these increasingly unavoidable for both the organization’s 
senior management as well as its constituent units. In addition, the comparatively high staff 
turnover which has seen younger experts joining the IEA’s various units, has led to a gradual 
introduction of a better understanding of the interconnections between energy and climate 
policy. Finally, taken together, the IEA’s moves can also be seen as an attempt to maintain its 
role as the leading international organization in the energy field. As one IEA official put it, if 
the organization ignored climate change as a key determinant of 21st century energy policies 
and did not seek to play an active role in addressing the problem, it “would be abdicating 
itself and render itself irrelevant in the energy debate.”32 
The change in the role of the IEA through the three sets of activities outlined in this 
paper – broadening its issue portfolio, partnering with the UNFCCC and IRENA, and 
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 Interview with IEA official, September 2014. 
32
 Interview with IEA official, June 2015. 
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advocating policy change – has a number of important implications for both global energy 
governance and the integration between global energy and global climate governance. First, 
the further widening of the IEA’s portfolio cements the Agency’s position as the leading 
international organization in the energy field. No other organization within the current global 
energy governance architecture can claim to credibly cover the entire spectrum of relevant 
issues – from oil and gas markets to energy efficiency, renewable power, GHG emissions and 
climate policy – with as much authority and wide distribution as the IEA.  
 Second, the IEA’s increased data collection and more positive outlook on renewables 
helps to build a stronger case for a transition away from fossil fuels and enables greater 
integration within global energy governance through a close cooperation with IRENA. If, 
following Van de Graaf (2013b: 18), the creation of IRENA in 2009 was meant to lead to the 
kind of “radical departure from our current energy path” seen as necessary yet hitherto 
impossible, then the IEA has shown its ability to help make the case for just such a change. 
 Third, the IEA’s expert input into the climate convention has supported and 
strengthened the work of the UNFCCC Secretariat, for example with regard to establishing 
reliable GHG emissions inventories, the UNFCCC’s expert policy review process or its 
technical examination process. This positive interaction of key players in the energy and 
climate fields, respectively, has brought about a greater integration between the two 
governance architectures.  
Fourth, the impact of the IEA’s change advocacy is not to be underestimated. 
Following Bauer’s (2009) work on “advocacy bureaucracies”, we contend that the IEA’s 
advocacy influence can be seen as both cognitive and executive. The IEA’s arguments in 
support of disruptive policy change and the sustained framing of tackling anthropogenic 
global climate change as a necessary step in the transition to a sustainable energy future have 
had a cognitive impact on numerous other actors by reducing ambiguity over core concepts 
and particular policy solutions, focusing attention and keeping the issue on the agenda. 
Critically, the arguments raised by publications such as the WEO and statements by the 
IEA’s Chief Executive and Chief Economist are increasingly in line with those made by 
leading actors in the global climate negotiations. Research on the impact of message framing 
conducted in a variety of fields has long recognized that source credibility makes a difference 
to people’s willingness to accept a product or argument (see e.g. Benford and Snow, 2000; 
Grewal et al., 1994; Mahon and Wartick, 2003). Both the high organizational credibility of 
the IEA in the energy field and the credibility of those officials engaging in the advocacy 
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(such as Fatih Birol) mean that the message is more likely to get accepted by target audiences 
than if it had come from other sources. For example, the impact of IEA data and reports on 
climate negotiations is amplified precisely because it is the IEA as a perceived “independent 
body” providing “heavy-hitting evidence” in support of rapid decarbonization rather than an 
environmental organization.33  
Beyond this cognitive influence, however, the IEA’s impact is also of an executive 
nature. The Agency has long been the “standard international point of reference for data and 
analysis in world energy markets” (Van de Graaf, 2012: 236), but the annual WEOs’ growing 
focus on climate change issues has also had direct implications for ministerial officials 
involved in global climate negotiations. Starting in 2009, publication of the WEO 
increasingly became a “regular date in the diary for climate change negotiators” which 
provided “incredibly helpful ammunition used in narratives with different countries.”34 The 
IEA’s change advocacy – with both its cognitive and executive impacts – has helped the 
Agency adapt to a changing environment while lending greater credibility to those arguing 
for a rapid decarbonization of the global economy.  
However, a key challenge arises from the IEA’s lack of directive influence over the 
energy policy decisions of its member countries. The IEA gathers statistics, recommends, 
advises and, as shown above, advocates certain courses of action but it cannot compel 
individual members to pursue particular policies, for example firmer GHG emissions targets 
or renewable energy support schemes, not least as such decisions are inextricable from 
important contestations and disputes in energy and climate policy direction. This restricts the 
ability of the IEA, and similar international organizations, such as IRENA, to turn into a 
reality the low-carbon future its leading officials are advocating. 
Further, while the IEA might be respected as a source of information and a political 
partner among the many emerging economies in the Global South, membership – and hence 
the right to vote – remains restricted to members of the OECD, that is, the traditional 
industrialized countries in the North, along with some richer Southern countries that have 
joined the OECD in recent years. Given the rapid growth of GHG emissions in non-member 
countries, this creates a challenge for the IEA in its attempt to bridge divides between energy 
and climate governance beyond the confines of the OECD.35  
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 Interview with former senior UK negotiator to the climate convention, March 2015. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 It is worth noting here that emissions embedded in goods manufactured outside the OECD (e.g.in China or 
India) but consumed within it are not currently accounted for in the domestic production-based GHG emissions 
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Thus far the IEA has been able to effectively work with other countries and 
intergovernmental organizations without expanding its core membership. In recent years it 
has stepped up cooperation with major energy producers and consumers around the world, 
particularly its seven partner countries in the G20, namely China, India, Brazil, Mexico, 
Indonesia, South Africa and Russia, as well as with selected member states of ASEAN. This 
cooperation has gone beyond just the issuing of occasional reports. The seven G20 partner 
countries actively participate in the IEA Ministerial Meeting, which takes place every two 
years to set broad strategic priorities for the Agency. The IEA’s statistics courses, for instance, 
are designed for and regularly attended by government representatives from non-member 
countries. In late 2013, the IEA and its partner countries (with the exception of Mexico) 
issued a Joint Declaration on Association which stated their mutual interest “to pursue closer 
cooperation on the basis of a common understanding that global energy challenges and 
energy security require shared solutions by producer, consumer and transit countries” (IEA, 
2013b). The planned association would be an important further step towards expanding the 
IEA’s reach beyond its traditional OECD membership. 
But whether or not these partnerships can be formalized to further expand the IEA’s 
influence, its cooperation with the UNFCCC and IRENA means that the Agency is already 
working, either directly or indirectly, with countries that are not currently among its members. 
Therefore, from the perspective of integrated governance approaches to energy and climate 
change, an enlargement of the IEA’s membership is perhaps not necessary in the current 
situation. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Global governance efforts have, to date, proven woefully inadequate to tackle the growing 
impact of human activities on the atmosphere, biosphere, geosphere and hydrosphere. The 
effective mitigation of global climate change is a monumental task, requiring nothing less 
than the “fundamental reorientation and restructuring of national and international institutions 
toward more effective earth system governance and planetary stewardship” (Biermann et al., 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
individual countries report to the UNFCCC. As with most other organizations gathering emissions statistics, the 
IEA also collates data on a domestic production basis. It is generally accepted that a full accounting would 
increase the GHG emissions profiles of industrialized countries, with serious implications for international 
climate negotiations. For a thorough discussion of consumption-based accounting of emissions see, for example, 
Davis and Caldera (2010) and Bruckner et al. (2010). 
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2012: 1306). The first necessary step of such a reorientation and restructuring is better 
integration of existing governance architectures in order to overcome the 
compartmentalization between the energy and climate change fields that has contributed to 
the lack of progress in drastically cutting GHG emissions. As we have shown, the IEA’s 
changing activities in recent years – broadening its issue portfolio, increasing its cooperation 
and partnership with the UNFCCC and IRENA, and advocating for a transition to a low-
carbon future – demonstrate that such integration is well underway. And yet, extant 
scholarship of both global energy governance and global climate governance has thus far 
been largely inattentive to such emergent integration. This is in part because energy and 
climate policy - at both domestic and international levels - has long evolved largely 
separately from each other, and, relatedly, so has the academic literature on these fields. 
However, with policy making in relation to energy and climate change becoming increasingly 
and deeply inter-connected, it behooves scholarship in each of these fields to be closely 
attentive to developments in the other. Indeed, as our analysis of the IEA’s changing 
activities shows, neglecting either dimension distorts understanding of both. 
The recent activities of the IEA we have discussed are a manifestation of changes the 
organization is undergoing as it engages with and adapts to a complex and dynamic global 
policy environment. Apart from closing gaps and creating further synergies between the IEA 
and key organizations in both global energy and global climate governance, these activities 
are also positioning the integration of energy and climate change itself as a central issue in 
both. In this way, they represent concrete steps towards the convergence of global policies 
and practices, the need for which is commonly acknowledged but has not been widely acted 
upon. The developments are not only beneficial from the perspective of effective climate 
change mitigation, but also hold two key implications for the IEA as an organization. First, 
they strengthen the Agency’s role going further into the 21st century. No serious international 
organization operating in the energy field today can do so without addressing climate change 
and the rise of renewable energy sources. The IEA is cementing its role in the field, in the 
process demonstrating its ability to respond effectively to past criticism and positioning itself 
to respond to future challenges. Second, the IEA’s recent activities are extending its influence 
well beyond the global energy governance field. The closer cooperation between the IEA and 
the climate convention has turned the IEA into a partner upon whose technical and policy 
expertise the UNFCCC Secretariat has come to rely. While the IEA does not (intend to) lead 
climate negotiations, it plays an increasingly important role within this process. Taken 
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together these are quite a turn for an international organization whose founding role was to 
coordinate responses to oil supply disruptions. 
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